Abstract: Digital technologies have given rise to a new combination of big data and computational practices which allow for massive, latent data collection and sophisticated computational modeling, increasing the capacity of those with resources and access to use these tools to carry out highly effective, opaque and unaccountable campaigns of persuasion and social engineering in political, civic and commercial spheres. I examine six intertwined dynamics that pertain to the rise of computational politics: the rise of big data, the shift away from demographics to individualized targeting, the opacity and power of computational modeling, the use of persuasive behavioral science, digital media enabling dynamic real-time experimentation, and the growth of new power brokers who own the data or social media environments. I then examine the consequences of these new mechanisms on the public sphere and political campaigns.
Big Data:
The advent of digital and networked technologies has caused an explosion in the amount and variety of data available on each individual, as well as the velocity with which such data become available (Bryant and Raja. 2014; Federal Trade Commission, 2014) . These large collections of data, referred to as big data, are not just more of old kind of data; rather, in some ways, its effects are like the invention of the microscope (Brynjolfsson, 2011) which makes visible the previously existed unseen, and in other ways, or like a telescope that allows the observer to "zoom out" and observe at a different scale, often at loss of subtlety and individuality of the data points but with powerful aggregate effects. While no single metaphor fully captures its novel impacts, big data, like the microscope and the telescope, threatens to upend our understanding of multiple fields and to transform the practice of politics.
What has changed is not just the depth and the scope of available data: the fundamental nature of data available for aggregation has undergone a significant shift. In the past, data collection was primarily "pull" (questions answered voluntarily as in surveys), supplemented by ENGINEERING THE PUBLIC: BIG DATA, SURVEILLANCE AND COMPUTATIONAL POLITICS Forthcoming: July 2014 issue of First Monday, Volume 19, Number 7 a layer of "latent data," which are data which exist as imprints of actions we carry out as we go about our lives In the pre-digital era, such latent, imprint data was limited-financial transactions, magazine subscriptions, credit-card purchases. Political campaigns were faced with the task of inferring what such a transaction meant. Does a subscription to "Better Homes & Gardens" imply a party affiliation? Does it correspond to a position on progressive taxation?
The answer often was, maybe, but only weakly. Such data provided some correlational guidance at the group level but did not allow precise individual targeting
The rise of the Internet itself as a social, civic and political space engendered a tremendous growth in a different category of data often called "user-generated" data. Some of this growth is of latent data; transactions which are carried out online for a wide variety of purposes now leave behind harvestable imprints. In latent data, the user is going about her day, say, purchasing products and participating on social media. The imprints she leaves behind, however, carry important information and include her actual conversations. Hence, unlike the explicit process in which a respondent is asked by a pollster about her choices, and the answer recorded, campaigns can now capture actual utterances of people as they talk about a wide variety of topics of interest to them. Data brokers increasingly scrape and examine user behavior in these environments and collate the responses, which they match with vast amounts of other online and offline data about the person (Federal Trade Commission, 2014) . This type of usergenerated content is directly semantic, and rather than convoluted inferences, such data lends itself to deeper and direct insight into a person's opinions, dispositions and behaviors (through computational methods discussed below).
The user-generated content environment has undergone such a dramatic change that even a mere eight years ago, when the Internet was already widespread, political campaigns had to Further, the quantitative depth of big data composed of online imprints is exponentially richer than pre-digital data. A big commercial database may easily contain from thousands datapoints on each individual-a recent report found that some data brokers had 3,000 individual data points per person, and were adding to it at a rapid pace (Federal Trade Commission, 2014) .
The volume and variety of this kind of big data is qualitatively different. If anything, the problem of data analysis today is data that is too much, too deep, and too varied. However, rise of computational methods and modeling is quickly catching up to the challenge of turning this deluge of data into operationalizable information at the hands of political campaigns.
Emergent Computational Methods:
All this data is burdensome without techniques to acquire usable information from the dataset. Computational methods used by political campaigns depend on multiple recent developments. First, technical developments in storage and database systems mean that large amounts of data can be stored and manipulated. Second, new methodologies allow processing of semantic, unstructured information contained in usergenerated natural language outputs such as conversations-as opposed to already structured data such as a financial transaction which come in the shape of already neatly packaged fields. Third, question. Strikingly, the results of such models may match the quality of the answers that were only extractable via direct questions, and far exceed the scope of information that could be gathered about a voter via traditional methods.
For example, a recent paper shows that merely using Facebook "likes" is sufficient to model and accurately predict a striking number of personal attributes including "sexual orientation, ethnicity, religious and political views, personality traits, intelligence, happiness, use of addictive substances, parental separation, age, and gender." (Kosinski, Stillwell, and Graepel, 2013) Researcher's models which solely used Facebook "likes"-a fraction of the data available to any data broker-correctly discriminated whether the Facebook user is heterosexual or not in about 88% of the cases; and predicted race with about 95% of the time and political party affiliation about 85% of the time (Kosinski, Stillwell, and Graepel, 2013) . In other words, just access to a fraction of Facebook data, processed through a computational model, allows for largely correctly delineating Republicans and Democrats without looking into any other database, voter registration file, financial transactions or membership in organizations.
While parts of this example may seem trivial since some of these, such as age and gender, are traditional demographics and are usually included in traditional databases, it is important to note that these are being estimated through modeling, and are not asked or observed from the user. This means that that such attributes can also be modeled in platforms where anonymous or pseudonymous postings are the norm. This type of modeling also furthers information asymmetry between campaigns and citizens, as campaigns learn things about the voter that she has no inkling has been modeled by the campaign.
Crucially, this type of modeling allows access to psychological characteristics that were beyond the reach of traditional databases, as invasive as those might have been considered. Personality traits such as "openness" or "introversion" or "neuroticism" are traditionally measured by surveys, which have been developed and validated by psychologists and used on a large number of people for decades. While such traits themselves may be generalizations, they are significantly more detailed than the crude demographics employed by political campaigners ("soccer moms."). The Kosinski, Stillwell, and Graepel, (2013) study also showed that shows that models based on Facebook likes were as good as the scientific scales. In other words, without asking a single question, the researchers were able to model psychological traits as accurately as a psychologist administering a standardized, validated instrument. Given that social media data have been used to accurately model attributes ranging from suicide rates to depression to other emotional and psychological variables (Choudhury, Gamon, Counts and Horvitz, 2013; Culotta, 2014; Quercia 2013) and given that social media is just one facet of information available for big data modeling, it is clear that political campaigns can have a much richer, more accurate categorization of voters, and without and before necessarily having knocked on their door a single time to ask a single question.
To understand why this is a major shift, consider how different it is compared with cruder, more basic profiling that has been used in traditional survey research to identify "likely" voters-a key political concern to campaigns. As Bryant and Raja (2014) (Yagoda, 2013) In contrast, during the 2012 election, the Barack Obama campaign the developed a fairly sophisticated model of "likelihood of turnout" based on its datasets, which do not just rely on surveys but incorporate the kinds of data discussed in this paper, and generated an index from 0
(not going to vote) to 100 (will certainly vote) for each potential voter. This resulted in a targeted, highly efficient persuasion and turnout effort (which focused mostly on turning out voters that were already Obama supporters rather than spending a lot of effort persuading voters who would not end up voting). This left the Romney campaigns, reliant on more traditional efforts, so far behind that after their loss, Romney staffers were left exclaiming that the Obama campaign turned out voters that the Romney campaign "never even knew existed" (Rutenberg and Zeleny, 2012). In 2014, Obama campaign staffers told a gathering at the Personal Democracy Forum that in key states, they were able to go deep into Republican territory, to individually pick voters that they had modeled as likely Democrats within otherwise Republican suburbs, breaking the lock of the precinct at voter targeting. The advantages of stronger, better modeling, an expensive undertaking that depends on being able to purchase and manipulate large emphasizes a provocative position only to sympathetic audiences, while it remains invisible to others. Prevalence of wedge issues is further damaging in that it allows campaigns to remain ambiguous on important but broadly relevant topics (economy, education) while campaigning furiously (but now also secretly) on issues that can mobilize a small but crucial segments.
Further, the construction of "wedges" need no longer pertain merely to issues; it can also incorporate psychographic profiles modeled from online social data-again, without directly obtaining data by asking the individual. Then, for example, fear-mongering messages can be targeted only to those motivated by fear. Unlike broadcast, such messages are not visible to broad publics and thus cannot be countered, fact-checked or otherwise engaged with in the shared public sphere the way a provocative or false political advertisement on broadcast might have been. This form of big data enabled computational politics is a private one, at its core opposed to the idea of the civic space as a public, shared commons. It continues a trend started by direct mail and profiling, but with exponentially more data, new tools and more precision.
The second negative effect comes via the information asymmetry and secrecy built into this mode of computational politics. The current surveillance environment has been compared to the "Panopticon"-Jeremy Bentham's model of a prison in which a guard is able to see all cells without revealing which one he is looking at any moment, and later used as a metaphor for modern surveillance by Foucault (1977) . While the observational aspect is similar, computational politics is currently exercised in a manner opposite of the Panopticon. Whereas the Panopticon operates by making very visible the act and possibility of observation, while hiding actual instances of observation, so that the "prisoner" never knows if she is being watched but is always aware that she could be, modern social engineering operates by making surveillance as implicit, hidden and invisible as possible, and, hopefully, without the observed were "products" is not only going become more expansive, it's going to get better, if more expensive. In this light, it is not a complete coincidence that the "chief data scientist" for the Obama 2012 campaign was previously employed by a supermarket to "maximize the efficiency of sales promotions." And while the data advantage is held, for the moment, by the Democrats, it will likely available to the highest bidder in future campaigns.
The methods of computational politics will, and already are, also used in other spheres such as marketing, corporate campaigns, lobbying and more. The six dynamics outlined in this paper-availability of big data, the shift to individual targeting, the potential and opacity of modeling, the rise of behavioral science in the service of persuasion, dynamic experimentation, and the growth of new power brokers on the Internet who control the data and algorithms-will impact many aspects of life in the 21 st century. More direct research, as well as critical and conceptual analysis, is crucial to increase both our understanding and awareness of the new information environment, as well as to consider policy implications and responses. Similar to campaign finance laws, it may be that data use in elections needs regulatory oversight due to its impacts for power, campaigning, governance and privacy. Starting an empirically informed, critical discussion of data politics for the 21 st century, by deepening our understanding, may be the first important step in asserting our agency with respect to the big data that is generated by us and about us, but is increasingly being used at us.
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